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We test the eﬀects of diﬀerent combinations of parties simultane-
ously holding oﬃce in the central and regional governments on re-
gional economic growth. We hypothesize that if such eﬀects indeed
exist, they should accrue through total factor productivity (TFP).
Using panel data for the Spanish regions over the 1988-2004 period,
we ﬁnd no eﬀects of any combinations of parties on TFP growth rate.
Our results are robust to diﬀerent methods of estimation and diﬀerent
measures of TFP and could have a twofold interpretation. On the one
hand, they could shed light on the consolidation of the governmental
institutions of the Spanish federal state model. On the other hand,
they could suggest, as shown by previous literature, that political ef-
fects on real economy could mainly accrue through aggregate demand
policies.
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11 Introduction
In a country with multiple governance levels, the governments involved are
responsible for the eﬀective linkage between and good performance of their
institutions, which can be deﬁn e da sr u l e sa n db o d i e st h a td r i v et h ep r o d u c -
tion atmosphere and are supposed to inﬂuence factor productivities. How-
ever, it is well known that diﬀerences in time might arise in the relationships
between the levels of government involved due to party objectives, commit-
ments, arrangements or disagreements. Speciﬁcally with mixed governance
(i.e. diﬀerent parties holding oﬃce at each level of government), disagree-
ments about certain projects are more likely to arise as a result of the diﬀerent
points of view, political objectives and priorities of each political party. In
fact, individual regional aspirations, major infrastructure projects or even
environmental laws and the justice administration could depend on the com-
binations of parties ruling the central and regional governments. However,
mixed governance has the advantage that it may function as a useful mech-
anism to prevent arbitrariness.
In this article we consider a developed country assumed to have qualiﬁed
institutions as deﬁned by Hall and Jones (1999)1,R o d r i c ket al. (2004) and
Dixit (2009)2 and focus on political institutions. Deﬁned in broad terms,
political institutions include political parties, electoral rules and governance
levels. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in analyzing the eﬀects that combina-
tions of parties holding oﬃce at the diﬀerent levels of government could have
on regional economic growth.
We consider a federalist country at two levels of governance, each of
which is characterized by a parliamentary system (central and regional par-
liaments) and whose representatives are elected democratically through elec-
toral processes. Which party governs depends on the composition of the
parliament. Thus, when there are at least two parties, mixed governance is
practically ensured in at least one region.
Literature relating the eﬀect of political parties on the economy perfor-
1They deﬁne social infrastructure as institutions and government policies that deter-
mine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills and ﬁrms ac-
cumulate capital and produce output.
2He used the term economic governance deﬁned as “the structure and functioning of
the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions
by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide
physical and organizational infrastructure.”
2mance falls in the Partisan Theory and Pork Barrel Politics.
Partisan Theory states that political parties have diﬀerent preferences
over macroeconomic goals. The seminal work of Hibbs (1977) showed that in
Western European and North-American nations, left-wing governments are
more concerned with low unemployment, while right-wing governments are
more concerned with low inﬂation.3 The "Rational Partisan Theory" (RPT)
of Alesina (1987) presents a theoretical model supporting Hibbs’ ﬁndings.
Moreover, Alesina and Sachs (1988) empirically conﬁrm Hibbs’ results for
the US case. Using data on OECD countries, Alesina and Roubini (1992)
found that in the short term (about two years) left-wing governments expand
the economy when elected. However, no support for permanent eﬀects on real
economy was found. Using the same database, Schmidt (1996) showed that
party inﬂuence on economic outcomes is contingent upon the type of democ-
racy, ﬁnding stronger partisan eﬀects in majoritarian democracies. However,
S c h m i d tp o i n t e do u tt h a ti ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to identify partisan inﬂuence
on public policy in consensus democracies in which the political-institutional
circumstances allow for co-governance of the opposition parties. MidtbØ
(1999) found that left-wing governments in the United States, Britain and
Canada have reinforced the growth of both public spending and GNP. Re-
cently, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) found for Sweden that left-wing govern-
ments lower the unemployment rate by increasing public employment and
spending and taxing more than right-wing governments.
Pork Barrel Politics can be broadly deﬁned as the practice of targeting
expenditure towards particular districts or regions based on political con-
siderations. From the theoretical point of view, we have two ﬁndings. On
the one hand, in the process to allocate funds, central governments may
favor regions governed by their allies and discriminate against regions gov-
erned by opposition parties in order to win re-election (Cox and McCubbins,
1986). On the other hand, central governments may channel more resources
to swing regions and diminish the uncertainty of the electoral outcome (Dixit
and Lodregan, 1995,1996).
According to the Partisan Theory and Pork Barrel Politics the eﬀect
of political parties on the economy accrues through the aggregate demand.
Therefore, an increase in the GDP corresponds to a shift upward of the
aggregate demand over an unchanged aggregate supply with positive slope.
3Av e r yg o o ds u r v e yo nt h eﬁrst ﬁfteen years of research on the Partisan Theory can
be found in Hibbs (1992).
3Therefore, only a higher demand would allow to increase the inputs (labor
and capital) of the production function, i.e., the production of the economy.
However, nothing is said about shifts in the aggregate supply or eﬀects on
factor productivities.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to test for political eﬀects on to-
tal factor productivity (TFP). We assume that the eﬀect of mixed gover-
nance on economic growth accrues through TFP. Therefore, we estimate the
TFP growth rate through a growth accounting exercise at the regional level.
Hence, this is an endogenous variable in our analysis. A particular functional
form has been speciﬁed for this variable to perform econometric estimations
that allow us to control for explanatory variables that have been shown in
t h el i t e r a t u r et oa ﬀect the TFP growth rate. Moreover, dummy variables
are introduced to capture combinations of parties ruling the diﬀerent levels
of government.
We consider the Spanish case at two levels of government: the central
level and the regional level and focus on part of the democratic period (1988-
2004) and all the autonomous communities.4 We basically ﬁnd three kinds
of parties which we have classiﬁed as right, left and regional.
Our goal is interesting not only at the Spanish level, but also at the
European level due to the resurgence of regional policies to reduce disparities
between European regions.5 Our results could be interpreted as a measure
of consensus between diﬀerent levels of government, i.e. among parties and
their eﬀects on the economy and could shed light of the consolidation of the
governmental institutions of a federal state.
Our results show that none of the combinations of parties at either level
of government have an eﬀect on the TFP growth rate at any conventional
signiﬁcance level.
The article is organized as follows. An overview of the Spanish political
system is presented in section 2. The econometric model and estimation
issues are described in sections 3 and 4, respectively, while conclusions are
drawn in section 5.
4The term "autonomous communities" refers to a set of territories that do not all share
t h es a m ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . S o m eh a v eam o r ed e veloped level of political decision-making
than others.
5The regional policy of the European Union seeks to promote the reduction of structural
diﬀerences between regions of the EU, the balanced development of the community and
to ensure equal opportunities for all people.
42 An Overview of the Spanish Political Sys-
tem
Governance levels: Administrative Divisions
(i) Central Government
Spain, or the Kingdom of Spain, has a constitutional monarchy with a
hereditary monarch and a bicameral parliament known as the Cortes Gen-
erales. The executive branch consists of a Council of Ministers presided over
by the President of the Government (comparable to a prime minister), who
is elected by National Assembly legislative elections and proposed by the
monarch. The Constitution of 1978 sets the framework by which the country
evolves and explicitly states the indivisible unity of the Spanish nation.
The Spanish nation is structured into what is known as the Estado de
las Autonomías (State of Autonomies), thus creating a unique system of re-
gional autonomy. Spain is one of the most decentralized countries in Europe,
alongside Switzerland, Germany and Belgium.
(ii) Autonomous communities
An autonomous community is the ﬁrst-level political division of the King-
dom of Spain as established under the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which
culminated the Spanish transition to democracy. As a result, Spain presently
comprises 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities with vary-
ing degrees of autonomy.
The autonomous communities enjoy broad legislative and executive au-
tonomy through their own parliaments and regional governments. The dis-
tribution of powers may vary in each community as laid out in the basic in-
stitutional law on autonomous communities, the Estatuto de las Autonomías
(Statutes of Autonomy). All autonomous communities have their own elected
parliaments, governments, public administrations, budgets and resources. As
a result, their health and education systems, among others, are managed re-
gionally. Furthermore, some communities also retain their economic and
ﬁscal autonomy allowing them to manage their own public ﬁnances and have
their own full-range police forces which replace some of the functions of the
state police corps. This assignation of functions at the regional level is known
as the Concierto Económico.
5The autonomous communities of Spain (NUTS2)6 are Andalusia, Aragon,
the Principality of Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, the
Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Catalonia,
Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre and Valencia.
(iii) Provinces and Municipalities
The Spanish Constitution recognizes, grants and protects two subdivi-
sions within the autonomous communities of Spain. As such, the provincias
(provinces) serve as the local territorial building blocks for the former and are
designed to carry out the activities of the state (the framework under which
the autonomous communities were created). They are self-governing territo-
ries, which are led by provincial councils in communities having more than
one province. Provincial councils have no legislative authority, but exercise
certain executive functions. In turn, the provinces are divided into munici-
pios (municipalities) which are granted autonomy to manage their internal
aﬀairs. Municipalities are the basic level of local government in Spain and
are led by city councils, whose highest authority is the mayor. The functions
carried out by these local bodies are considered to be in closest proximity to
citizens.
Today, Spain is divided into 52 provinces and 8112 municipalities.
Political System
Spain’s political system resembles a two-party system insofar as there
are two dominant political parties, making it relatively diﬃcult for political
representatives to achieve electoral success under the banner of any other
party. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Es-
pañol, PSOE) and the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) are the strongest
parties. However, regional or nationalist parties can have a stronghold in au-
tonomous communities such as Catalonia (Convergència i Unió, CiU) and
the Basque Country (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) and are essential for
central government coalitions or parliamentary majorities, thus transforming
Spain’s two-party system into a multi-party system.
Electoral Processes
6From 1979 to 1983, all the regions of Spain were established as autonomous commu-
nities. The process concluded in 1996 when Ceuta and Melilla gained autonomous status,
but these last two cities are not considered in our study.
6General and regional elections are typically held at four-year intervals
with some exceptions. In our sample period general elections were held in
1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004. Regional elections took place in Aragon,
Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La
Mancha, Castile-Leon, Valencia, Extremadura, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia
and Navarre on the same day in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003. Andalusia held
elections in 1990, 1994, 1996, 2000 and 2004; the Basque Country in 1990,
1994, 1998 and 2001; Galicia in 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001; and Catalonia in
1988, 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003.
3 Econometric Model
Let us consider that the TFP evolves according to a function as follows
Bit
Bit−1
= f (δi,τt,D it,SI it,AE it,CE it,hc it,k
pu
it ,ε it), (1)
where Bit is a measure of the TFP of region i in year t when labor
is adjusted for human capital, δi is a speciﬁcr e g i o n a le ﬀect and τt is a
time eﬀect. Dit is a vector that collects our political variables including
dummy variables for the diﬀerent combinations of parties ruling both levels
of governments.
In our context, right and left parties can hold oﬃce in both central and
regional governments. However, regional parties can only be in charge of
regional governments. Let us deﬁne the People’s Party (PP) as a right party,
and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) as a left party. Let R
(L)b ead u m m yv a r i a b l et h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo fo n ew h e nt h er i g h t( l e f t )
party holds oﬃce in the central government, and zero otherwise. And let
r,l,n be dummy variables that take the value of one when the right, left
and regional parties7 respectively govern the i autonomous community, and
zero otherwise. We also consider dummy variables that take the value of one
if the central government holds a majority (M)o ram i n o r i t y( m), thus al-
lowing us to control for the possibility of negotiation between central and
7In our sample period, regional or nationalist parties which held oﬃce can be considered
center-right parties. These include the PNV in the Basque Country, CIU in Catalonia,
Coalicion Canaria in the Canary Islands, Partido Aragonés in Aragon, and Unión para el
Progreso de Cantabria and Partido Regionalista de Cantabria in Cantabria.
7regional governments headed by diﬀerent parties. In line with common po-
litical practice, when central governments lack a majority, they are willing
to make concessions to regional parties governing autonomous communities
in order to gain support for a law, the national budget, a foreign mission,
etc. In fact, the Spanish experience shows that regional parties can play a
key role in forming the central government when a majority is not reached.
On the contrary, when the central government holds a majority, partners are
not needed and there is no reason to negotiate to bring a proposal forward.
By constructing the interaction of dummies described above, we can spec-
ify the vector that collects the combinations of parties as
Dit =
µ
MRrit,MRl it,MRn it,mRr it,mRl it,mRn it,
MLlit,MLr it,MLn it,mLl it,mLr it,mLn it
¶0
(2)
When the central government holds a majority we have that MRrit
(MLlit)i sad u m m yv a r i a b l et h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo fo n ew h e nt h er i g h t
(left) party simultaneously holds oﬃce at both levels of government, and
zero otherwise; MRlit (MLrit) is a dummy variable that takes the value of
o n ew h e nt h er i g h t( l e f t )p a r t yh o l d so ﬃce in the central government and
the left (right) party rules the regional government, and zero otherwise; and
MRnit (MLnit) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the
r i g h t( l e f t )p a r t yh o l d so ﬃce in the central government and a regional party
rules the regional government, and zero otherwise. When the central govern-
ment holds a minority, mRrit, mRlit, mRnit, mLlit, mLrit,a n dmLnit stand
for the same combinations as above.8
We also introduce a set of controllers that the empirical literature has
shown to inﬂuence the TFP growth rate, as described below.
SIit is a specialization index as speciﬁe db yÁ l v a r e z( 2 0 0 7 )t h a ta c c o u n t s
for the diﬀerent economic structure of the regions with respect to the whole












where subscript j denotes the sector (agriculture, industry, energy, construc-
tion and services), Yit,j is the gross added value of sector j in region i in year
8Notice that the ﬁrst year of governance does not cover the whole year. Therefore, if in
the ﬁrst year of governance the party took oﬃce before June, this variable takes the value
of one, and zero after June.
8t, Yit is the total gross added value of region i in year t and Yt,j and Yt
stand for values referred to Spain. SIit is zero when the regional productive
structure is equal to that of the whole country and increases with the level
of specialization.
AEit and CEit are variables that collect the eﬀects of agglomeration and
congestion in the regional economies. Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone
(2002) show theoretical and empirical positive eﬀects of agglomeration on
labor productivity for the US and Europe. For Dutch regions, Broersma
and van Dijk (2008) recently found that positive agglomeration eﬀects over-
rule negative congestion eﬀects on total factor productivity. Therefore, we
use similar indicators: the number of eﬃcient works relative to the surface
(Nit/Si) for agglomeration eﬀects and the total number of cars per kilometers
of roads (cit/kmit) for congestion eﬀects.9
hcit is an indicator of the regional healthcare system. Cole and Neumayer
(2006) found that poor health has a negative impact on TFP. A good
healthcare system is related to healthy people, i.e. more productive workers.




it is a variable accounting for annual stock of regional public infrastruc-
ture per eﬃcient worker. Aschauer (1989) found a positive relationship be-
tween public capital stock and TFP for the US. It is argued that poor in-
frastructure is one of the factors that may explain lowest per capita income
and disparities in levels of productivity across European regions. In this re-
gard, the provision of infrastructure under the EU’s regional policy has played
a central role in reducing disparities in levels of productivity and per capita
income in regions of the European Union.11 Therefore, we consider "core
infrastructure" per eﬃcient worker in k
pu
it , which includes streets and high-
ways, water systems, railways, airports, ports and other urban infrastructures
9Regional data on surface, cars and roads are taken from the National Statistics Insti-
tute of Spain (INE).
10Data on hospital beds in the regions are taken from the INE.
11Founded on the concepts of solidarity and economic cohesion, this policy will ma-
terialize through various ﬁnancial measures, in particular those of the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund. In 1986, the Single European Act introduced the objective of
economic and social cohesion. Finally, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) incorporated this
policy into the EC Treaty (Articles 158 to 162). For the 2007-2013 period, regional policy
is the second largest budget item of the European Union, with a strength of 348 billion
euros.
9provided by local governments.12
Finally εit is an iid disturbance.
































Taking natural logarithm in (3) and considering the speciﬁcation of the
vector Dit in (2), we obtain the equation to be estimated,
4Log(Bit)=δi + τt + β1RMRrit + β2RMRlit + β3RMRnit
+β4RmRrit + β5RmRlit + β6RmRnit
+β1LMLlit + β2LMLrit + β3LMLnit
+β4LmLlit + β5LmLrit + β6LmLnit (4)















+ θ5 4 Log (k
pu
it )+εit
Our endogenous variable, 4Log (Bit), is a non-observable variable that
we calculate by performing a growth accounting exercise which is shown
in the Appendix. An alternative to our approach is the econometric esti-
mation of the production function, that is, to regress the growth rate of
output (∆Log (Yit)) on the growth rate of inputs (∆Log (Kit),∆Log (Nit))
and all variables on the right side of (4). However, Barro (1999) stresses
the disadvantages of this approach such as endogeneity problems between
∆Log(Kit),∆Log (Nit) and 4Log (Bit), inconsistent estimation if ∆Log (Kit)
and ∆Log (Nit) are measured with errors and the static factor shares. Fol-
lowing a similar approach, Broersma and van Dijk (2008) highlight that
the growth-accounting approach and the econometric approach are not com-
petitors, but can instead complement one another. Therefore, econometric
methods can be applied to further explain the productivity residual from
growth accounting, which is what we are going to do in our analysis.
12These correspond to the classiﬁcation by asset 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 according
to the new methodology of the BBVA Foundation-IVIE .
104 Estimation Issues
Tables 1 and 2 show pooled and panel data regressions respectively of the
equation (4) for both measures of TFP (At and Bt)13. Panel data regression
considers individual and time ﬁxed eﬀects which are not shown for reasons
of space.14 We discard one time ﬁxed eﬀect in order to avoid perfect multi-
collinearity.
As it can be noticed, both pooled and panel data regression show similar
results. We concentrate in describing the results for the latter. Notice also
that results for both measures of TFP are similar.
Like Álvarez (2007), we have found that the more specialized the region,
the higher the growth of TFP. The estimator is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The agglomeration and congestion eﬀects show unexpected signs. More-
over, they are not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance
level. Martínez-Galarraga et al. (2008) show evidence of agglomeration ef-
fects in Spain over time. They pointed out that those eﬀects seem to have
been falling sharply from the mid-nineteenth century until late in the twen-
tieth century. Moreover, according tot h e i rr e s u l t st h e r ea p p e a r st ob en o
positive evidence of agglomeration eﬀects in industry in the period 1985—
1999.
According to the general literature and to the literature speciﬁcally re-
lated to Spain, the estimation of the parameters that capture the eﬀects of
the healthcare system and public infrastructure are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level and are higher when TFP is adjusted for hu-
man capital. Using data from the autonomous communities of Spain, Rivera
and Currais (2004) found the striking result that current government health
spending has consistently signiﬁcant positive eﬀects, while governmental in-
vestment in healthcare has no eﬀect on productivity. Aviles et al. (2001)
suggest that public capital accumulation can be considered a tool for improv-
ing the competitiveness of Spanish ﬁrms since it reduces production costs.
Along the same lines, Mas et al. (1996), Salinas-Jimenez (2003) and Álvarez
and Delgado (2004) conﬁrm that there is a signiﬁcant positive contribution
of infrastructure on both private production and the eﬃciency of Spanish
regions.
As regards our main variables of interest (Dt), none of the coeﬃcients
13Regressions for Ait use Lit instead of Nit.
14We also carried out panel data regression with individual and time random eﬀects and
obtain very similar results. Estimations are available upon request.
11of the combination of parties are signiﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance
level. Our results could be in line with those of Alesina and Roubini (1992)
who found no support for permanent partisan eﬀects on real economy.
In general, our results could have a twofold interpretation. On the one
hand, if major structural economic reforms or changes in economic policy
did not occur during the period in question, there is no reason to expect
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect of party combinations on the growth rate of TFP.I n
fact, the Spanish experience shows that major changes in economic policy
took place in the early eighties to modernize the economy and meet the
requirements for European Union adhesion. Moreover, it can be thought
that Spanish governmental institutions have reached a high relative level of
consolidation, such as the evolution of TFP is not aﬀected by partisan eﬀects
which sheds light on the success of the Spanish federal state model from the
economic point of view. On the other hand, our results could suggest that
political eﬀects do not aﬀect the aggregate supply. Therefore, and in line
with the previous literature, political eﬀects on real economy could mainly
accrue through aggregate demand policies which is the assumption in which
is based the Partisan Theory and Pork Barrel Politics.
We report the F-test of null hypothesis of homogeneous individual and
time ﬁxed eﬀects (Fi and Ft). We are unable to reject Fi at the any con-
ventional signiﬁcance level and we reject Ft at 5% level for both measures of
TFP. Therefore, we can state that Spanish regions does not exhibit speciﬁc
regional diﬀerences in TFP.H o w e v e r ,t i m ed i ﬀerences in the growth of TFP
do account for.
Notice that the model is able to explain about 37% of the variability of
the non-adjusted TFP growth rate and 68% of adjusted TFP growth rate.
Moreover, the value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is very close to 2,
thus suggesting no autocorrelation in the residuals from the regression and
no omission of relevant economic variables in our speciﬁcation. Finally, our
results are robust to diﬀerent methods of estimation and diﬀerent measures
of TFP.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this article we test the eﬀects of diﬀerent combinations of parties ruling the
central and regional governments on the economic growth of Spanish regions
over the 1988-2004 period. We assume that these eﬀects, if indeed they
12exist, should accrue through total factor productivity (TFP). Therefore, we
estimate the TFP growth rate series for Spanish regions through a growth
accounting exercise. We specify functional forms for the growth rates of
TFP to estimate an equation accounting for explanatory variables which are
well-established in the literature.
We found that combinations of parties have no eﬀect on the growth rate
of TFP. Our results could be interpreted somehow as a consolidation of the
governmental institutions of the Spanish federal state model and that polit-
ical eﬀects on real economy could mainly accrue through aggregate demand
policies.
13Appendix: TFP growth calculations
In this appendix we perform a growth accounting exercise for the 1988-
2004 period to estimate the evolution of TFP in regions of Spain. We con-
sider the standard assumptions about technology represented by an aggregate
Cobb-Douglas production function and about input markets, capital and la-
bor, which are given by perfect competition. The representative region i






The ﬁnal aggregate output (Yit) is the annual gross added value of au-
tonomous community i in year t provided by the National Statistics Institute
of Spain (INE). The number of employees per year or annual labor input (Lit)
is based on statistics of the Bancaja Foundation and the Economic Research
Institute of Valencia (IVIE). The annual stock of non-residential productive
physical capital (Kit) is provided by the BBVA Foundation and IVIE.15 Ait
is a measure of the total factor productivity (TFP)16 in region i at each year
t17.
Moreover, we assume a speciﬁc aggregate production function with labor






where Bit is the TFP when labor is adjusted for human capital and Nit
denotes the amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production






where j =0 ,1,2,3,4 is levels of education, xj is years of each educational
level18 and ηj is the rate of return to schooling (known as the Mincer index,
1974) from Lassibille and Navarro (1998).
15The Yit and Kit series are referred to in constant euros with base year 2000.
16Ait is a good approximation to neutral technical progress using growth accounting in
a non-parametric context.
17Annual data is considered for the seventeen autononomous communities. The sources
for the statistics used for each variable are shown in section 4.
18We assume the middle point of each range of years of schooling, which are assumed
to be equal for all regions and constant over time.
14Regarding the choice of labor share series, 1 − αit, for the autonomous
communities of Spain, we do not only consider the published series of wages
because they might be underestimated if they are not adjusted to include
self-employed and family workers. We use the measure proposed by María-
Dolores and Puigcerver (2005) in order to correct for this bias.19
Given our choice of series for output Yit,l a b o rLit, productive physical
capital Kit, capital share αit, years of schooling xj a n dr a t eo fr e t u r nt os c h oo l -
ing ηj, we calculate the growth rate of TFP through the Divisia-Tornqvist
index as follows,






(1 − αit)+( 1− αit−1)
2
∆Log(Nit)
∆ is the incremental operator and the log diﬀerentials are growth rates.
19This measure takes into account the value of labor income referred to as "mixed
income".
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18Table 1: Pooled Regression for the growth rate of TFP
Non Adjusted TFP (Ait) Adjusted TFP (Bit)
Coeﬃcient Std Error Coeﬃcient Std Error
Constant -0.01267 0.00780 -0.01934∗∗ 0.00766
MRr 0.00640 0.00564 0.01017 0.00621
MRl 0.00378 0.00618 0.00728 0.00678
MRn 0.00477 0.00723 0.00682 0.00798
mRr 0.00312 0.00534 0.00366 0.00589
mRl -0.00088 0.00754 0.00253 0.00827
mRn 0.00367 0.00723 0.01029 0.00791
MLl 0.00869 0.00544 0.00619 0.00597
MLr 0.00555 0.00671 -0.00061 0.00734
MLn 0.00587 0.00688 0.00386 0.00756
mLl 0.00582 0.00547 0.00246 0.00601
mLr 0.00424 0.00595 0.00425 0.00656
mLn 0.00792 0.00682 0.00588 0.00752


















0.14552 0.03506∗∗∗ 0.23463∗∗∗ 0.03627
4Log(k
pu
it ) 0.08365 0.03318∗∗ 0.13913∗∗∗ 0.03537
R2 0.24336 0.51184
DW 1.97451 1.96246
∗∗ ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ =S i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
19Table 2: Panel regression for the growth rate of TFP with time and individual
ﬁxed eﬀects
Non Adjusted TFP (Ait) Adjusted TFP (Bit)
Coeﬃcient Std Error Coeﬃcient Std Error
MRr -0.01048 0.01161 -0.01276 0.01240
MRl -0.01303 0.01179 -0.01355 0.01259
MRn -0.00975 0.01425 -0.00782 0.01505
mRr -0.00433 0.01150 -0.00899 0.01223
mRl -0.00590 0.01270 -0.00546 0.01357
mRn -0.00086 0.01410 0.00377 0.01497
MLl 0.01337 0.00941 0.01217 0.01010
MLr 0.00926 0.01066 0.00501 0.01134
MLn 0.01048 0.01038 0.01567 0.01086
mLl -0.01147 0.01276 -0.00738 0.01378
mLr -0.01368 0.01319 -0.00872 0.01414
mLn -0.00708 0.01390 0.00177 0.01474


















0.16811∗∗∗ 0.03854 0.24361∗∗∗ 0.03853
4Log(k
pu
it ) 0.16192∗∗∗ 0.04733 0.28132∗∗∗ 0.04638
R2 0.36820 0.61580
DW 2.05346 2.02843
Fi 1.02430 (0.43189) 1.37986 (0.15303)
Ft 2.00497 (0.01846) 3.07762 (0.00022)
∗∗ ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ =S i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
20